IPv6 Routing Header Security.

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CanSecWest 2007

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Outline

- 1 IPv6 prerequisite
 - IPv6 : the protocol
 - Think different, Think IPv6
- 2 All about Routing Header extension
 - Definition
 - RH odds
 - RH handling by IPv6 stacks
- 3 Security implications
 - Advanced Network Discovery
 - Bypassing filtering devices
 - DoS
 - Defeating Anycast
- 4 Solutions and workaround
 - Filtering RH : problems and needs
 - Practical filtering

IPv6 prerequisite

All about Routing Header extension Security implications Solutions and workaround IPv6 : the protocol Think different, Think IPv6

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
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IPv6 : the protocol Think different, Think IPv6

Structural differences with IPv4

New header format


From 14 to 8 fields



IPv6 : the protocol Think different, Think IPv6

Structural differences with IPv4 Chaining and extensions

Goodbye IP options, welcome IPv6 extensions!



P. Biondi / A. Ebalard

IPv6 : the protocol Think different, Think IPv6

Functional differences with IPv4

Forget all you knew about IPv4

Autoconfiguration Mechanisms

- ARP is gone. Replaced and extended by Neighbor Discovery
- Broadcast replaced by link-local scope multicast

End-to-End principle

- Extended address space provides global addressing
- Releasing core routers from intensive computation.
 - Fragmentation is performed by end nodes,
 - Checksum computation is performed by end nodes at L4,
 - IPv6 header fixed size simplifies handling (or not).
- NAT not needed under IPv6
 - \implies less stateful devices
 - \implies less Single Points of Failure

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IPv6 prerequisite

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IPv6 prerequisite

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End-to-End is back !!!

What is different ?

- NAT removal : replaced by pure routing
- Global addressing capabilities (result of extended @ space)
- Direct connectivity not only client \rightarrow server or client \rightarrow relay \leftarrow client
- Everything is done between source and destination (E2E)
 - Mandatory L4 Checksum
 - Fragmentation
 - Extension header handling

 \implies To limit core routers load, default case is easier to handle.

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IPv6 : the protocol Think different, Think IPv6

Filtering on end points ?

Rationale

- Network is flat again (no more NAT)
- Move from *client* → *relay* ← *client* towards direct connections
- Pushed by new requirements : VoIP, IM, P2P, ...
- Direct connectivity implies new security requirements
- IPsec implementation is mandatory in IPv6 stacks. IPsec works natively on IPv6 networks.

Concern

Are IPv6 stacks, applications and systems robust enough to handle global connectivity requirements ?

IPv6 prerequisite

All about Routing Header extension Security implications Solutions and workaround IPv6 : the protocol Think different, Think IPv6

Cryptographic Firewall

Merging IPsec and Firewall functions

- End-to-End implies new threats for clients
- Leveraging current 5-tuple filtering logic (src @, dst @, protocol, src port, dst port) to add cryptographic identity.
- Allowing access to that apps from that guy with that credential (X.509 Certificate, Kerberos Token, ...)
- Limiting the attack surface to the authentication (IKE[v2]) and protection (IPsec) functions ...
- \implies People outside your trust domain can only target IKE/IPsec.
- \implies Your vicinity is no more geographical but cryptographical.

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Definition RH odds RH handling by IPv6 stacks

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
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Definition RH odds RH handling by IPv6 stacks

Routing Header format

An address container

IPv6 specification [RFC2460] defines Routing Header extension as a mean for a source to list one or more intermediate nodes to be "visited" on the way to packet's destination.




Definition RH odds RH handling by IPv6 stacks

Different types of Routing Header

- **Type 0** : the evil mechanism we describe in this presentation, that provides an extended version of IPv4 loose source routing option.
- **Type 1** : defined by Nimrod, an old project funded by DARPA. This type is unused.
- **Type 2** : used by MIPv6 and only understood by MIPv6-compliant stacks. Defined to allow specific filtering against Type 0 Routing Header. Inoffensive extension.

Definition RH odds RH handling by IPv6 stacks


Type 0 Routing Header Equivalent to IPv4 lose source routing option



All about Routing Header extension Solutions and workaround

Definition RH handling by IPv6 stacks

Type 0 Routing Header mechanism example How a packets is modified during its travel



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IPv6 Routing Header Security.

Definition **RH odds** RH handling by IPv6 stacks

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The Node, the Host and the Router

Definitions (extracted from [RFC2460])

- Node : "a device that implements IPv6".
- **Router** : "a node that forwards IPv6 packets not explicitly addressed to itself"
- Host : "any node that is not a router".

Like the Little Red Riding Hood

"The Routing header is used by an IPv6 source to list one or more intermediate nodes to be "visited" on the way to a packet's destination." — from [RFC2460]



Definition **RH odds** RH handling by IPv6 stacks

RH Type 0 : the bullet in the foot

Expected support

Section 4.1 of [RFC2460] : "IPv6 nodes must accept and attempt to process extension headers in any order and occurring any number of times in the same packet, ...

IPv6 designers preferred useless functionalities over good sense

- RH mechanism definition is 17% of the specification !!!
- RH0 related threats are not considered in [RFC2460].

Side note

L4 checksum is incorrect during transit

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Quick OS support summary for Type 0 RH

How stacks handle en-route source routed packets

OS	Host	Router	Deactivable?
Linux 2.6	dropped	processed	no
FreeBSD 6.2	processed	processed	no
NetBSD 3.1	processed	processed	no
OpenBSD 4.0	processed	processed	no
MacOS X	processed	processed	no
Cisco IOS	n/a	processed	yes
Cisco PIX	n/a	dropped	n/a
Juniper RTR	n/a	processed	no
Netscreen FW	n/a	dropped	n/a
Windows XP SP2	dropped	n/a	n/a
Windows Vista	dropped	n/a	n/a

Remark #1: by "Deactivable" we do not consider firewalling, only sysctl or equivalent means Remark #2: red indicates a problem, bold and red a big one EADS

Advanced Network Discovery Bypassing filtering devices DoS Defeating Anycast


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
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Remote and boomerang traceroute





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Testing Ingress filtering Checking if an ISP filters spoofed traffic from its clients

Idea

- Find a reachable client's box that supports Type 0 RH
- 2 Send a boomerang packet
- If the boomerang comes back, ISP does not implement ingress filtering

The Scapy6 one-liner

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Finding attractors

Idea

- Escape the local attraction with a RH0-friendly node far away
- Once there, packets undergo attraction close to the node
- Use many nodes to discover many attractors

Possible targets

DNS Root Servers: attract traffic to specific anycast addresses 6to4 relay routers: attract traffic to 2002::/16 Teredo relays: attract traffic to 2001:0000::/32

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Playing around in DMZ (1/2)

Facts

- BSD hosts all process routing headers by default,
- Firewalls are not equal regarding stateful IPv6 filtering,
- Firewalls are not equal regarding RH0 filtering,
- DMZ protection level greatly depends on many factors (OS, policies, rulesets, architecture)

• . . .

Concerns


- Can I use RH0 to hide traffic or payload to devices ?
- Can I reach an internal hidden host through a visible host ?

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Playing around in DMZ (1/2)

Can we force internal hosts to create FW state ?



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Save an admin, crash an IOS

Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20070124-IOS-IPv6

- The evil: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/ cisco-sa-20070124-IOS-IPv6.shtml
- The score (CVSS) : Base Score 10
- The cure (?) : http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ products_security_response09186a00807cb0df.html
- \implies Stupid but extremely annoying and effective DoS.
- \implies Test BGP efficiency ... :-(

A one packet crash for IPv6 enabled IOS-based Cisco routers.

Collapse the IPv6 Internet, plug off a country with a simple packet

IPv6 prerequisite Advanced Network Discovery Bypassing filtering devices DoS Solutions and workaround Defeating Anycast

Funny game Rules of the game

Goal

Keep an IPv6 packet as long as possible in the IPv6 Internet routing infrastructure.

Rules

- No L4 help : only IPv6 L3 infrastructure hijacking
- No cheating : tunnels are banned (2002::/16, ...)
- No abuse : it's only a game !!

Clue It's based on Routing Header mechanism ...

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Funny game (take one)

Current high score

```
>>> addr1 = '2001:4830:ff:12ea::2'
>>> addr2 = '2001:360:1:10::2'
>>> zz=time.time();
    a=sr1(IPv6(dst=addr2, hlim=255)/
    IPv60ptionHeaderRouting(addresses=[addr1, addr2]*43)/
    ICMPv6EchoRequest(data="staythere"), verbose=0, timeout=80);
    print "%.2f seconds" % (time.time() - zz)
```

>>>



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    print "%.2f seconds" % (time.time() - zz)
32.29 seconds
>>>
```

Link saturation / Amplification effect

- 4 Mbit/s upload bandwidth,
- 32 seconds storage between the 2 routers
- $ullet \Longrightarrow 16$ MBytes of additional traffic stored on the path

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
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Storage in the network



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Now, let's cheat !

6to4 : The beginning of IPv6 transition

- Automatic tunneling of IPv6 traffic over IPv4
- Direct connectivity to other 6to4 sites
- Use of 6to4 relays to address native IPv6 hosts

Like other tunneling mechanisms . . .

When a packet is routed through 10 routers, IPv4 TTL is decremented by 10 where IPv6 Hop Limit is decremented only by 1.

Reuse previous trick

- Find 6to4 relays that support RH0
- Take two relays with a huge RTT value

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Advanced Network Discovery Bypassing filtering devices **DoS** Defeating Anycast

Funny game (take two)

New high score [cheating]

```
>>> addr1 = '2002:96b7:296::1'
>>> addr2 = '2002:81fa:dd::1'
>>> zz=time.time();
    a=sr1(IPv6(dst='2001:320:1b00:1::1', hlim=255)/
    IPv60ptionHeaderRouting(addresses=[addr1, addr2]*43)/
    ICMPv6EchoRequest(data="staythere"), verbose=0, timeout=80);
    print "%.2f seconds" % (time.time() - zz)
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>>>



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37.50 seconds
>>>
```

Link saturation / Amplification effect

- 4 Mbit/s upload bandwidth,
- 37.5 seconds storage on the IPv4 path between the 2 routers,
- \implies 4 \times 37.5 = 150 Mbits stored on the path

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Advanced Network Discovery Bypassing filtering devices **DoS** Defeating Anycast

Funny game (take two)

New high score [cheating]

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
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
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Bandwidth Amplification Buy 4, get 352 !!!



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Capacitive effect A flux capacitor



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Defeating Root DNS servers anycast architecture

How does DNS architecture work ?

- 13 DNS Root Servers that handle TLD (all IPv4, many IPv6)
- Anycast technology is used for efficiency and security (cf March 2007 attack)
 - Not a unique cluster behind an address
 - Many servers specific for each geographical area (topological internet area)
 - Queries routed to closest one (using BGP)
- Load is also handled locally through load balancing

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Defeating Root DNS servers anycast architecture The case of F Root DNS server IPv6 instances


Facts

- Maintained by ISC
- Address : 2001:500::1035
- Heavy use of *BSD as host OS
- 15+ different sites in the world
 - 2 Global nodes : Palo Alto and San Francisco
 - 13+ Local Nodes (local optimizations) : Auckland, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Paris, Osaka, Los Angeles, London, Lisbon, New York, Munich, Chicago, Prague, Seoul, Ottawa, ...
- Most of the load handled by global nodes .

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Where IPv6 F Root Server instances are located



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Let's practice

Few lines example >>> FROOT="2001:500::1035" >>> GERMANY="2001:5001:200:4::2" >>> resp=sr1(IPv6(dst=FROOT)/UDP()/DNS(qd=DNSQR(qclass="CH", qtype="TXT", qname="HOSTNAME.BIND"))) >>> resp[DNS].an.rdata 'pao1a.f.root-servers.org' Palo Alto instance ! >>> resp=sr1(IPv6(dst=GERMANY)/IPv6ExtHdrRouting(addresses=[FROOT])/ UDP()/ DNS(qd=DNSQR(qclass="CH", gtype="TXT", qname="HOSTNAME.BIND"))) >>> resp[DNS].an.rdata 'mucla.f.root-servers.org' Munich instance ! >>>

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Defeating Root DNS servers anycast architecture Impacts

Adding more ingredients

- IPv6 bots availability : direct DoS against Local instances
- Core routers bug availability : DoS against all instances by targeting previous routers on the path.

Conclusion

- Type 0 RH badly defeats security benefits of anycast
- Heterogeneity for Internet core routers is a requirement

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F root loops



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F root loops





Filtering RH : problems and needs Practical filtering

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Filtering RH : problems and needs Practical filtering

Challenges for processing Routing Header

Routing Header processing

- **Complexity :** number and order are loosely defined.
- **Performance cost :** handling is made outside fast path for waypoints
- **Position :** Packets can be different from what they will look like on ultimate destination (checksum).
- **Context** : limited understanding on the path make it difficult to filter
- Handling : Should we say RH0 packets go to a waypoint or through a waypoint ? Is it real routing ?
- **Type :** totally different semantics across different Routing Header types (Type 2 for MIPv6)

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Filtering RH : problems and needs Practical filtering

Expected Filtering capabilities

What we would like

- Simple deactivation of RH processing (should be default)
- Availability of filtering logic based on RH Type value (MIPv6)
- Limitation of extension headers nesting with low default value
- Distinction between :
 - strictly forwarded packets we want to inspect (current address is not one of ours)
 - temporarily destined packets (we are a waypoint)
- Possibly, access to final destination (interest with RH2)
- Automatic handling of bad scope addresses

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Filtering RH : problems and needs Practical filtering

Outline

- IPv6 prerequisite
 - IPv6 : the protocol
 - Think different, Think IPv6
- 2 All about Routing Header extension
 - Definition
 - RH odds
 - RH handling by IPv6 stacks
- 3 Security implications
 - Advanced Network Discovery
 - Bypassing filtering devices
 - DoS
 - Defeating Anycast
- 4 Solutions and workaround
 - Filtering RH : problems and needs
 - Practical filtering

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Filtering RH : problems and needs Practical filtering

Main RH-related filtering capabilities

<i>OS</i>	RH deactivation	RH filtering	Filter on RH type
Linux 2.6	no	yes	yes
PF	no	no	no
IPFW	no	yes	no
IPFilter ¹	no	yes ²	no
Windows	always	yes	_
IOS	yes	yes	yes
Cisco PIX	always	_	no
Netscreen	always	_	no

¹Information on this row was provided by Darren Reed

²More than one occurence of a RH will flag the packet as invalid a

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Filtering RH : problems and needs Practical filtering

Conclusion

Conclusion

- Type 0 RH mechanism is of no use, except for attackers
- Side effects against the whole Infrastructure are terrible
- IPv6 designers did not learn from IPv4 on that point
- IPv6 developers also forgot some IPv4 best practices

Advice

- Protect yourself: prevent RH0 from flowing in your networks
- Protect the core: prevent your hosts to process them
- Be MIPv6 friendly when possible (Type 2 RH have no impact)

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Filtering RH : problems and needs Practical filtering

That's all folks! Thanks for your attention. Questions are welcome.

Big thanks to Fabrice Desclaux for 3D-foo and Guillaume Valadon for ideas and discussions on RH issues.

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Getting Scapy: wget scapy.net Getting Scapy6: hg clone http://hg.natisbad.org/ scapy6 EADS











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S. Deering, R. Hinden, Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2460.txt



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IPv6 Routing Header Security.

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Main RH related filtering capabilities (1/3)

Local RH processing deactivation

Local RH processing deactivation

- Linux and *BSD have sysctl for IPv4 source routing option, but no IPv6 counterparts.
- Cisco IOS provides the no ipv6 source-route command
- Windows provides no mean but implements a conservative default behavior (drops en-route packets)
- Netscreen and Cisco FW drop them unconditionally.

Main RH related filtering capabilities (2/3)

Support for RH filtering

- Available in Netfilter (ipv6header and rt matches).
- Available in Cisco IOS ACL (routing keyword)
- Available in IPFW2 (ext6hdr keyword)
- Access to "IPv6-Route (proto 43)" in *Windows Firewall with advanced security* snap-in in MMC.
- IPv6 extension headers (including RH) not supported by PF.
- Status unknown for IPFilter

Main RH related filtering capabilities (3/3)

Support for RH Type (i.e. MIPv6-friendlyness)

- Cisco recently added routing-type keyword to IOS ACL
- Netfilter rt match has support for -rt-type
- Windows clients being end hosts and having no decent MIPv6 support, it is not available nor required.
- FreeBSD IPFW2 does not allow filtering on RH Type.
- PF has no support. Status is unknown for IPFilter.

History

- April 24, 2007: Clarification and fixes on bandwidth calculations in slides 31, 34 and 35.
- April 27, 2007: Added MacOS X in comparison table of slide 20.
- May 16, 2007: Added IPFilter information provided by Dareen Reed on slide 49. Updated last slide.

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